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Which Measures of Time Preference Best Predict Outcomes? 
Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment
* 
 
Economists and psychologists have devised numerous instruments to measure time 
preferences and have generated a rich literature examining the extent to which time 
preferences predict important outcomes; however, we still do not know which measures work 
best. With the help of a large sample of non-student participants (truck driver trainees) and 
administrative data on outcomes, we gather four different time preference measures and test 
the extent to which they predict both on their own and when they are all forced to compete 
head-to-head. Our results suggest that the now familiar (β, δ) formulation of present bias and 





A great deal of evidence suggests that when waiting increases the size of the monetary 
reward, many economic decisions and outcomes are affected by the degree to which 
individuals are willing (or not) to wait for future payments. Using a large sample of non-
student subjects (trainee truckers) who took part in an extensive set of economic field 
experiments, we compare the effectiveness of four ways of measuring such “time 
preferences” at predicting real life outcomes for these subjects. The measurements are two 
standard parameters (“beta” and “delta”) derived from choices over future payments, 
surveyed impatience, and performance on a waiting task. The outcomes are smoking, credit 
score, body mass index, and on-the-job success. Though each has strengths and 
weaknesses, overall the beta-delta model does best. 
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Since the early work of Irving Fisher (1930) and Paul Samuelson (1937), economists have
placed a lot of theoretical weight on time preferences to explain individual choices across a
variety of domains from ﬁnance to bargaining or even lifestyle choices that aﬀect one’s health.
At around the same time psychologists also became interested in time preferences but tended
to focus on the ability of people to delay gratiﬁcation, control their impulses and the links
between these abilities and personality. The culmination of all this interest is a rich variety of
ways to measure time preferences. Within economics it is now standard, via an incentivized
experiment, to elicit a simple discount factor, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, for future payoﬀs, although if
present bias is thought to be important, the diﬀerence in how discounting occurs when
today is involved is also typically captured using 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 (Laibson, 1997; Harrison et al.,
2002). Together, these parameters now formulate the (β,δ) model of preferences (Frederick
et al., 2002). In psychology, the delay of gratiﬁcation literature was heavily inﬂuenced by the
impulsivity work of Walter Mischel, who showed that a simple experiment in which young
children were asked to choose between one cookie (or marshmallow) now and two in ﬁfteen
minutes could predict achievement later in life (Mischel et al., 1989). In addition, along the
way in both disciplines surveys have been developed to capture not only the more common
elements of time preference like δ (e.g., the Health and Retirement Survey; Barsky et al.,
1997), β (Ameriks et al., 2007) and impulsivity (Dickman, 1990), but some surveys have
also embedded time preferences in broader theories of personality (e.g., the Jenkins Activity
Survey for Type A personality; Jenkins et al., 1967).
Given all these ways to measure time preference, we are interested, as others have been
in the past, in the important question of which ways best predict outcomes. For example,
there is a rich tradition in economics of measuring associations between discount factors
and outcomes like human capital accumulation (Eckel et al., 2005) or savings (Ashraf et
al., 2006). Using a diﬀerent measure but asking a similar question, psychologists have also
been interested in how impulsiveness predicts school achievement (e.g., Shoda et al., 1990).
Given the current work in both disciplines on the prevealence of hyperbolic discounting,
many recent papers have studied the ability of both δ and β to predict outcomes. As
just three examples, Meier and Sprenger (2010) ﬁnd a much stronger relationship between
present bias and credit card debt than between this sort of debt and a traditional measure
of one’s discount factor, Mitchell (1999) shows that smokers appear less patient on both
a hypothetical discounting task and a surveyed impulsivity scale, and Zhang and Rashad
(2008) report that surveyed “willpower” correlates with body mass index (BMI), especially
for men. While there is considerably more research in this vein (e.g., Picone et al., 2004 or
1Eckel et al., 2007), one thing about the existing literature that is particularly conspicuous is
that in most cases time preferences are measured using only one method and, as a result, no
proper “horse race” has been conducted to see if one method robustly predicts better than
the others.
We report the results of an experiment in which we gather four measures of time prefer-
ence designed to be representative of the current methods (i.e., δ, β, impulsivity and surveyed
impatience) and test the extent to which these measures predict important health outcomes
like smoking and BMI, credit scores, and subsequent job related outcomes. Aside from hav-
ing all four measures of time preference and being able to let them compete “head-to-head”
for the ﬁrst time, there are a number of other factors that make our study unique. Instead of
relying on university students who rarely face all the important decisions that we study, our
participants were older and had more life experience. Our sample is also much larger than the
typical lab experiment. We were able to gather preference and outcome data, along with a
large number of other regressors, from more than one thousand participants. While previous
studies have often relied on surveyed outcomes, all but one of our outcome variables come
from adminstrative data and therefore are not subject to any self-reporting biases. Lastly, it
is common in this literature for causation to be ambiguous, largely because time preferences
and outcomes are collected coterminously and therefore the direction of causation is unclear.
While this is true for three measures that we use to replicate previous work (smoking, BMI
and credit scores), we were also able to gather subsequent job performance measures that,
together with our rich set of controls, allow us to be more conﬁdent that the relationships
that we estimate are causal.
Our results suggest that all of the four measures of time preference have some predictive
power. For example, run in isolation our behavioral measure of impulsivity predicts smoking,
β predicts credit scores, and δ predicts not just leaving the job but going absent without
leave (AWOL) to list just a few of the interesting correlations. However, when they are all
allowed to compete for variation in the same regression model with a number of controls, it
appears that the quasi-hyperbolic (β,δ) formulation predicts best. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
neither surveyed impatience nor impulsivity predict outcomes very well. At the same time,
however, we ﬁnd that present biased participants (i.e., those with low βs) are more likely to
smoke, leave the job for any reason, and wash out of job training. In addition, participants
with low discount rates (i.e., high δs) are also less likely to smoke, have better credit and are
less likely to go AWOL from the job.
We proceed by ﬁrst describing our measures of time preference and our participants in
Section 2. In Section 3 we examine our measures of time preference in detail by looking
for demographic correlates and by assessing the extent to which the instruments measure a
2common trait. Our main results are presented in Section 4 where we begin by looking at the
simple correlations between the measures of time preference and six outcomes. We then add
controls and force all four measures to compete for variation in the outcome measures. At
the end of this section we consider a few robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the paper
with a summary.
2 Eliciting Time Preferences
Between December 2005 and August 2006 we gathered data from 1,069 truck driver trainees
at one of the training facilities of a large midwestern motor carrier ﬁrm. Ninety-one percent
of the ﬁrm’s trainees to whom we oﬀered the opportunity participated. There were between
18 and 30 participants in each group; each group took part in two two-hour long sessions. In
addition to a show-up fee of $20 ($10 paid at the beginning of each session), all parts of the
experiment (except the questionnaires) were incentivized. In the end, participants earned
between $21 and $168 with an average of $53. A more complete account of the design and
the context of the broader project can be found in Burks et al. (2008). We continue by
providing the details of the time preference measures that we gathered and by summarizing
the other survey and administrative data that we use in the present paper.
2.1 Measures of Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting
Our instrument to measure δ and β was constructed similarly to many of those surveyed in
Frederick et al., (2002). Participants made a total of 28 binary choices between a sooner
smaller amount of money and a later but larger amount. The amount of the later larger
payment was ﬁxed for each choice at $80 and the amount of the sooner smaller payment
stepped down from $75 to $45 in $5 decrements. In principle, participants would begin by
choosing the early payment until the total decrement is large enough and then they ﬂip over
and choose the later payment.
To identfy present-bias separately from discount factors, the choices were split into four
blocks of seven choices each and organized as follows: (i) today versus tomorrow, (ii) today
versus ﬁve days from today, (iii) two days from today versus nine days from today and (iv)
two days from today versus thirty days from today. Because we were explicitly interested in
measuring present-bias, we decided to not employ a front-end delay (a la Coller and Williams,
1999) longer than the duration of the experiment for the ﬁrst two blocks. Considering we
were sanctioned by the ﬁrm’s management to conduct our research, the typical rationale for
adding such a delay - that not believing you will be paid in the future makes one seem more
3impatient when today is involved - was much less likely to be a problem; all participants
could be sure that they would be paid.
To pay participants for this part of the experiment, 28 numbered chips were placed in a
bowl and one was drawn at random to determine the choice that would count. Two more
chips were then drawn from a diﬀerent bowl that included one chip for each participant in
the session to identify two people at random to pay. Payments were either made in person
or via mailed oﬃcial bank checks.
We are able to use the diﬀerent delays to identify individual-speciﬁc estimates of δi and
whether or not today was involved to identify estimates of βi. Speciﬁcally, we adopt the
model of (β,δ)-preferences proposed by Phelps and Pollack (1968) and Laibson (1997). We
measure the amount xi such that the individual is indiﬀerent between receiving it now and
receiving $80 t periods (measured in days) from now. Indiﬀerence implies
u(xi) = βδ
tu(80). (1)
If the choice is between receiving an amount xi s periods from now or $80 t + s periods
from now, indiﬀerence then implies
u(xi) = δ
tu(80). (2)
Taking logs of equations (1) and (2), we get
logu(xi) − logu(80) = logβ + tlogδ (3)
if the choice involves today (as in our choice blocks 1 and 2), and
logu(xi) − logu(80) = tlogδ (4)
if it doesn’t (as in our choice blocks 3 and 4). We assume that u is approximately linear
over the relevant range and then use ordinary least squares and the following speciﬁcation
to estimate βi and δi for individual i in choice block k = 1,2
logxi,k − log80 = logβi + tk logδi + ei,k. (5)
For choice block k = 3,4 we use
logxi,k − log80 = tk logδi + ei,k. (6)
In each case xi,k is the amount at which the individual switched to the future payment in
4block k, tk is the delay (in days) of the larger payment, and ei,k is a mean-zero error term.
2.2 A New Measure of Impulsivity
To try to capture the essence of the Mischel delay of gratiﬁcation experiments (Mischel et
al., 1989) we decided to design a new, adult version of the task in which participants were
forced to trade oﬀ unproductive waiting time against monetary compensation (instead of
treats).
As described above, the entire experimental session was split into two segments, each
about two hours long, between which there was a break of between 10 and 20 minutes. The
impulsivity experiment came at the end of the ﬁrst segment. In this experiment, which we
call the (big) red button, participants were forced to sit at their stations and do nothing for
10 minutes while a timer on the computer screen counted down from 600 (in seconds). They
were not allowed to talk, surf the internet, read or do anything other than wait quietly. The
instructions on the screen read, “If you stay another 10 minutes, we will pay you $5 on top
of what you have already earned. You do not have to stay, however. On the next screen,
there is a red button that you can click. Each click of the button shortens the amount of
time you have to wait until this activity is over.”
The instructions then stated the “cost of clicking” function: the ﬁrst click of the red
button lowered one’s payoﬀ by $1 but reduced the waiting time by 5 minutes. The second
click of the button cost an additional dollar but reduced the wait time by another 3 minutes
and the last click of the button again cost a dollar but reduced the wait 2 more minutes to
zero. We take the number of clicks as a measure of impulsivity.
It is important to note that the activity directly preceding the red button experiment
was a demographic survey that participants completed at their own pace. This ordering
of the activities was done purposely so that people would start the red button experiment
at diﬀerent times and any peer eﬀects would be minimized. When seeing someone leave,
the other participants could not tell whether that person had taken a relatively long time
on the demographics and then clicked the red button or was done relatively early with the
demographics and then waited the full 10 minutes in the red button experiment.
2.3 Surveyed Impatience
Based on the questions asked in a variety of surveys in the psychology literature meant to
capture short term impatience, we added six questions from the World Health Organization’s
self-reported scale for adults to the survey segment of our experiment. Participants were
asked to oﬀer responses on a 5-point Likert scale (never, rarely, sometimes, often, very often)
5and the exact wording of the questions was as follows: (i) How often do you have trouble
wrapping up the ﬁnal details of a project, once the challenging parts have been done? (ii)
How often do you have diﬃculty getting things in order when you have to do a task that
requires organization? (iii) How often do you have problems remembering appointments or
obligations? (iv) When you have a task that requires a lot of thought, how often do you
avoid or delay getting started? (v) How often do you ﬁdget or squirm with your hands or
feet when you have to sit down for a long time? (vi) How often do you feel overly active and
compelled to do things, like driven by a motor?
To summarize the responses to these questions we dichotomize the responses, add up
the number of times a participant expressed extreme views (i.e., responding very often) and
use factor analysis on the dichotomized responses. The resulting six-question impatience
scale seems to have some consistency (Chronback’s α equals 0.54 which is not too small
considering the number of questions) and there appears to be a common factor because the
analysis results in an eigenvalue of 1.83 which exceeds the standard threshold of 1.
2.4 Our Participants
The top portion of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on our participants. In addition
to a demographic survey, each participant completed two cognitive ability assessments. The
ﬁrst was a computerized version of the non-verbal IQ instrument discussed in (Raven et al.,
2003) in which participants were asked to complete patterns. The second, our numeracy
instrument, was developed by the Educational Testing Service and asked people to add,
subtract and compare numbers. It was one half of the adult quantitative literacy exam
administered in the format provided by the ETS. The average participant scored 45 out of
60 in IQ, 8 out of 12 in numeracy. In addition, there is considerable variation in the cognitive
ability of our participants: approximately one quarter of the participants did not correctly
complete more than two-thirds of the IQ patterns or answer more than half of the numeracy
questions correctly.
Considering the more standard demographics, our average participant was middle-aged
(37 years old), more than half (57%) had some schooling beyond high school, about half
(48%) were married and very few minorities enter training at the upper Midwest location
where we collected data: just 14% were African American and only 3% said that English
was a second language. We also have data on the previous work and earning experiences of
our participants. On average, participants had been unemployed for slightly more than two
months (2.23) in the previous two years, 70% reported having family incomes less than thirty
thousand dollars per year and almost half (45%) reported monthly expenditures greater than
6$1500. Lastly, more than a quarter of our participants (28%) had spent some time in the
military.
3 Time Preferences, their Determinants and the Inter-
correlations
The second section of Table 1 summarizes the results from our time preference instruments.
Because factoranalysis suggested that we shouldfocus our attention on the extreme responses
from our six-question impatience scale, the mean of adding the indicators for each question
is rather low (0.21). At the same time, 15% of respondents had one or more extreme views
so there is some variation in the scale.
Also in Table 1 we see that our estimates of present-bias vary from being extremely
impatient when today is concerned (βi = 0.56) to actually being slightly future-, not present-
, biased (βi = 1.07). Despite the variation in βi, the modal estimate is for people to show
no bias and be indistinguishable from exponential discounters (i.e., βi = 1). The range
of δi is much more conﬁned because we calculate daily discount factors. That said, there
is still considerable variation and two prominent modes arise, one near δi = 0.976 which is
consistent with rarely choosing to wait and another at δi = 1 indicative of people who always
waited.
In Table 2 we examine four discounting types. In the ﬁrst cell (i.e., where δ = β = 1) we
place 52% of our participants because our estimates indicated that they were statistically
indistinguishable from people who were perfectly patient and not present-biased (i.e., for
these people we could not reject the null that δi = 1 and βi = 1 at the 10% level). Here the
mean daily discount factor is 0.989 and the mean estimated level of present bias is 0.921.
Along the diagonal in Table 2 we ﬁnd that 6% of our participants had estimated βs and δs
that were both signiﬁcantly less than 1. For these people the mean δ is 0.986 and the mean
β is 0.826. We also ﬁnd that 9% of our participants demonstrate signiﬁcant present bias but
are otherwise patient (i.e., δ = 1 but β < 1) and that the remaining 33% are not present
biased (β = 1) but appear to discount outcomes signiﬁcantly (δ < 1).
One quarter of our participants clicked the red button at least once. The distribution of
clicks is such that 15% of people clicked only once, 3% clicked twice and almost 6% clicked
three times. In terms of waiting time, Table 1 indicates that, indeed, most people waited
the entire 10 minutes because the average time waited is 525 seconds. At the other end of
the spectrum, the average time waited by the people who clicked three times was only 75
seconds and 17% of these people waited less than 30 seconds, in total.
7In Table 3 we use ordinary least squares, probit and negative binomial regressions (with
robust standard errors) to estimate the impact of the participant demographics on the elicited
measures of time preference. For convenience, we report standardized marginal eﬀects for the
continuous variables. In the ﬁrst column, we see that only schooling above the high schoole
level and military service predicts surveyed impatience (here the dependent variable is the
factor score). Those participants with some secondary education respond less patiently in
the survey (p < 0.10) and those who had previously served in the military were more patient
(p < 0.01).
The second column of Table 3 indicates that older participants and those with higher
cognitive skills are less present-biased (i.e., have βs closer to 1).1 However, African Americans
and married participants appear signiﬁcantly more present-biased. A standard deviation
increase in numeracy is associated with a 0.185 standard deviation increase in β (p < 0.01).
The eﬀects of age and education are more modest. A standard deviation increase in age is
associated with a 0.091 standard deviation increase in β (p < 0.01). Similar associations
arise in column 3 for the discount factor. Here a standard deviation increase in numeracy
is associated with an increase in the daily discount factor of 0.105 standard deviations (p <
0.01). Compared to the β estimates, the eﬀect of age is even stronger. A standard deviation
increase in age correlates with a 0.163 standard deviation increase in δ (p < 0.01). The
eﬀect of education is also stronger on δ (p < 0.01). Although the eﬀects are signiﬁcant,
the magnitudes are small on a few other demographics. Considering English as a second
langauge and having relatively high monthly expenditures are both associated with being
more patient and being African American is associated with being less patient (p < 0.01).
In the last two columns of Table 3, we see that cognitive skills, age and education are
factors that also inﬂuence the number of red button clicks. People with higher cognitive skills
are signiﬁcantly less likely to click at all (p < 0.01) and click less often (p < 0.01). However,
unlike β and δ, older people are more, not less, likely to click (p < 0.01) and the eﬀect is
substantial. Similar to our numeracy results, we also ﬁnd that having more education is
signiﬁcantly associated with clicking less (p = 0.01).
As one can readily see in Table 3, there are a few factors that seem to commonly aﬀect
our measures of time preference (e.g., cognitive ability, education and age) and, as a result,
it is also likely that our measures are related and measure slightly diﬀerent versions of
a common trait. However, the correlations do not always follow the same pattern. While
higher cognitive ability and more education are consistently associated with more patience as
measured by β, δ and the red button, when we consider age the eﬀects bifurcate. Only with β
and δ is age associated with more patience. To examine the intercorrelations of our measures
1A similar eﬀect of age on being present-biased has been reported in Ameriks et al. (2007).
8more closely, we calculated the raw rank correlations between β, δ, the factor score from the
survey measure of impatience and whether or not one clicked the red button. Importantly,
although the resulting correlations are low, they are all consistent with a common latent
trait: not clicking is positively correlated with both β and δ (ρ = 0.066, p = 0.01 and
ρ = 0.071, p = 0.01, respectively) and it is negatively correlated with the survey factor score
(ρ = 0.042, p = 0.16).
As further evidence that clicking the red button also measures some aspect of time
preference, in Table 4 we report the results of regressing the number of red button clicks
on the other three measures of time preference, both one at a time in columns (1)-(3) and
altogether in column (4). Individually, each measure is signiﬁcantly associated with red
button clicks. As one becomes less present biased (i.e., as β → 1) or more patient (δ → 1)
people click the button less (p < 0.01 and p = 0.02, respectively) and those people who
appear less patient on the survey also click more (p = 0.10). However, what might be the
most interesting result in Table 4 is that when all three other measures of time preference are
included in the same regression, only present bias remains signiﬁcant. To us this indicates
what we hoped for - red button clicks are likely to measure the impulsivity inherent in other
measures of present bias.
4 Time Preferences and Outcomes
We split our analysis of the predictive ability of the diﬀerent time preference measures into
two parts. The ﬁrst part examines outcome variables that are more common in the literature
and were collected at the same time as our experiments by the ﬁrm that we worked with.
Although we have a rich set of controls and these outcomes are not likely to be biased by
self-reporting (with the possible exception of our height and weight measures) because the
ﬁrm gathered the data2, it is hard to be conﬁdent that, like the previous literature, we are
capturing more than associations. In the second part of the analysis, however, we can be
much more conﬁdent that our we are estimating causal relationships because our outcomes
were gathered in the months following the experiments.
4.1 Coterminous Outcomes
Returning to Table 1, in the third section we summarize the data that we collected on
coterminous outcomes. While at the training program, the ﬁrm put up trainees at a local
2Karlan and Zinman (2008), for example, illustrate the importance of not relying exclusively on self-
reports of behavior.
9motel. We knew whether or not a participant smoked from his or her motel reservation
preference - 46% did at the time of our study. Height and weight data were collected as
categorical variables in our demographic survey from which we could calculate body mass
index by assigning values and using the standard formula: (703×weight)/(height2). By this
measure, 42% of our participants had scores above 30 and could, therefore, be considered
obese. Because the trainees eﬀectively post a performance bond at the beginning of the
course by signing a training contract which states that they will pay back the market value
of training (between $3500 and $5000 at the time of data collection) if they do not stay on
the job for a year, the employer was also able to collect the credit scores of the trainees at
our request. Many of our participants did not have “good” credit. The average FICO score
in our sample is 588 which is below the standard sub prime cutoﬀ of 620 (Keys et al., 2010).
We utilize the administrative data to test if our measures of time preference can predict
the incidence of smoking, credit scores and BMI. As a ﬁrst pass, consider Figure 1 in which
surveyed impatience, β, δ, and the number of red button clicks (aka impulsivity) are split
at their medians to demonstrate the “raw” eﬀects of each measure on normalized outcomes.
According to the ﬁrst graph from the left, surveyed impatience, by itself, does not have a lot
of predictive power. Those scoring relatively high on impatience are no more or less likely to
smoke (p = 0.61), have about the same credit worthiness (p = 0.99), and BMI (p = 0.39) as
those who score low. The other three measures of time preference predict better, however.
In the second graph we see that present biased participants (those with lower than median
βs) are signiﬁcantly more likely to smoke (p < 0.01), and have signiﬁcantly worse credit
scores (p < 0.01). The exact same story holds for the discount factor in the third graph.
Again, the less patient (i.e., those with lower δs) are more likely to smoke and have worse
credit (p < 0.01 in both cases). Contrary to Zhang and Rashad (2008), we ﬁnd that none of
our measures predict BMI.
As one can see from Figure 1, there are a number of signiﬁcant correlations between
the coterminous outcomes and our four time preference measures; however, we are most
interested in running a proper race to see which measures survive when all are forced to
compete for the variation in outcomes. In Table 5 we present estimates of the associations
between all the time preference measures and smoking, credit scores and BMI, including a
full set of controls.
Column (1) lists the marginal eﬀects after a probit estimation for smoking. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant eﬀects of both discounting and present bias: standard deviation increases in both
β and δ are associated with a reduction of approximately a tenth of a standard deviation
in the likelihood of smoking (p < 0.05 in both cases).3 We ﬁnd, however, no signiﬁcant
3Chabris et al., (2008) ﬁnd a similar result - a signiﬁcant link between discounting and self-reports of
10relationship between smoking and our impatience survey or the number of red button clicks.
As for demographics, we ﬁnd that African American trainees are 24.3% less likely to smoke
(p < 0.01), married drivers are 6.6% less likely to smoke (p < 0.10), that those trainees with
high monthly expenditures are also 8.2% less likely to smoke (p < 0.10), and the longer a
trainee has been umemployed, the more likely he is to smoke (p < 0.10).
In the second column of Table 5 are the credit score results. Here we ﬁnd a strong
relationship between one’s discount factor and one’s credit score but no relationship with
being present-biased.4 Here a standard deviation increase in δ is associated with a 0.121
standard deviation increase in one’s credit score (p < 0.01). Along with the fact that δ is
a strong predictor of credit scores and β is not, we also see that the two other measures of
time preference do not signiﬁcantly correlate with credit scores. Cognitive skills, age, and
ethnicity do however, appear to be important: a standard deviation increase in numeracy
increases credit scores by 0.080 standard deviations (p < 0.10), a similar increase in age raises
one’s score by nearly a quarter of a standard deviation (p < 0.01) and African Americans
in our sample tend to have scores that are approximately 50 points lower than the baseline
(p < 0.01).
The results for body mass index are reported in column (3). Contrary to Chabris et al.,
(2008), we ﬁnd no link between time preferences and BMI. We do ﬁnd a few demographic
correlates: being more numerate is associated with higher BMI (p < 0.05), non-native English
speakers have lower BMI (p < 0.05), being unemployed longer is associated with higher BMI
(p < 0.05) and having military experience is a strong predictor of lower BMI (p < 0.01).
Overall, our results on coterminous outcomes suggest that there are a number of sig-
niﬁcant and interesting bivariate correlations, although many disappear when all our time
preference measures are placed in the same regression. When forced to compete, β does well
to predict a situation in which weakness of will is surely at play (smoking) but it is δ that
seems to perform best.
4.2 Subsequent Outcomes
The administrative records also provide data on subsequent training and job performance.
This data is summarized at the bottom of Table 1. For example, we know whether trainees
completed their training or “washed out”.5 We also know who completed training but left
smoking - and like Bickel et al., (1999) and Mitchell (1999) we ﬁnd a link to being present-biased.
4Our results are not contrary to Meier and Sprenger (2010) who ﬁnd a strong link between being present-
biased and having more credit card debt because more debt does not necessarily translate into lower credit
scores unless one does not pay the debt on time.
5“Washing Out” here includes both quitting before ﬁnishing training, and also failing to pass one of the
required phases of training.
11the job later, during the two year follow-up data collection period. As it happens, this part of
for-hire trucking, long-haul “truckload,” has had high turnover rates since the deregulation
of 1980. The American Trucking Associations surveys member companies, and until the
recent recession had never recorded an average turnover rate among large carriers like the
cooperating ﬁrm of less than 100% (Burks, et al., 2008). Why such high turnover? This
segment of the trucking industry is essentially perfectly competitive, so ﬁrms don’t have
rents to share. The pay is on piece rates (by the mile), and it is hard to earn much at ﬁrst,
given the modest starting rate. The job involves long (on the order of 60) and irregular hours
of work each week, and drivers are away from home for two weeks or more at a time, plus
drivers have to continually adjust their time use to account for hours of service regulations,
shipper and consignee demands, traﬃc conditions, and weather (Burks, et al., 2010).
In this context turnover might just be a matter of drivers optimally searching for a good
match. But the training contract changes the interpretation. When the driver has posted a
signiﬁcant bond that becomes due and payable in full upon exit for any reason before twelve
months, even modestly impatient trainees will ﬁnd it in their interests to continue on the
job for the remainder of the year. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to tenure lengths of up
to 12 months.
Returning to the bottom of Table 1, despite the strong incentives, two-thirds of the
trainees did not complete the 12 months of employment after training that would have
canceled their training debt. Considering typical reasons for leaving, eleven percent left
before even ﬁnishing the driver training program and in many cases drivers simply walked
away from the job, abandoning their rigs. In our sample eventually going absent without
leave (AWOL) was the outcome for ten percent of the trainees.
To examine the raw relationships between time preferences and subsequent outcomes, in
Figure 2 we again break our four time preference measures at the median but now look at the
eﬀect of being relatively impatient (or not) on ensuing training and job performance. Note
that because the probability of separation for any reason is so high, we graph not leaving
instead so that all the bars have a common scale. In the ﬁrst graph we see that the impatience
survey does not signiﬁcantly predict any of the subsequent job outcomes. Although all the
β correlations appear to go in the “correct” directions: present biased trainees are less likely
to stay on the job, washout more often, and are more likely to go AWOL, only the general
separation result is signiﬁcant (p = 0.07) in this simple, ﬁrst pass, analysis. The results look
similar, if not a bit stronger, in the third, δ graph. Here patient trainees are more likely to
stay on the job (p = 0.10) and are less likely to go AWOL (p = 0.01). In this simple bivariate
context, the red button measure of impulsivity also performs poorly. In the fourth graph,
only the fact that red button clickers seem somewhat more likely to washout of training is
12close to signiﬁcant (p = 0.11).
In Table 6 we force the four time preference measures to compete “head-to-head”. In
column (1) which reports probit marginal eﬀects we see that only present bias predicts leaving
for any reason (p < 0.10). Reducing present bias by a standard deviation corresponds to a
subsequent 0.065 standard deviation decrease in the likelihood of job separation. Cognitive
skills also appear to continue to matter here: a standard deviation increase in IQ is associated
with a 0.169 standard deviation decrease in the likelihood of leaving (p < 0.01). Lastly,
African Americans tend to leave signiﬁcantly more often (p < 0.05).
The eﬀects of time preferences on leaving because one did not ﬁnish training are presented
in column (2) of Table 6. Here we see that only the number of red button clicks does not pre-
dict washing out of the training program. A standard deviation increase in survey-measured
impatience increases the chances of washing out by 0.043 standard deviations (p < 0.05).
We also see that both β and δ predict, and the eﬀects are as one would expect: a standard
deviation reduction in present bias predicts a 0.081 standard deviation reduction in washing
out of training (p < 0.05) and the eﬀect of δ is similar. Our estimate suggests increasing
patience by a standard deviation translates into a 0.066 standard deviation decrease in the
likelihood of washing out (p < 0.05). Considering the demographics, we ﬁnd that trainees
with higher IQ are less likely to wash out of training (p < 0.01) and older, minorities and
those who have been unemployed longer are signiﬁcantly more likely to washout.
When we consider going AWOL from the job in column (3) we see that only the discount
factor predicts and the sign of the eﬀect is consistent with intuition. A standard deviation
increase in δ, suggests a 0.100 standard deviation decrease in the probability of going AWOL
(p < 0.01). Other factors that predict going AWOL include cognitive ability and age.
Trainees with higher numeracy scores go AWOL less often (p < 0.05) as do older trainees
(p < 0.05).
To summarize, looking at subsequent job performance where we can be more conﬁdent
of the causal nature of our estimates we see even starker results. Here neither the survey
nor our impulsivity experiment predict outcomes with any regularity. Only β and δ seem to
predict across domains. Reconsidering the eﬀects presented in Figure 2, it seems that adding
δ to our estimates of the eﬀects of β helps - the eﬀect of present bias appears to be clearer
only after controlling for one’s baseline level of patience.
4.3 Robustness Checks
We also tested whether two alternative formulations of our analysis would signiﬁcantly change
our conclusions. First, to give our new delay of gratiﬁcation instrument another opportunity
13to perform better we created an indicator for clicking the red button any number of times
and substituted it into the speciﬁcations in Tables 5 and 6. The outcomes of this exercise
appear in Table 7. Overall, we ﬁnd, essentially, the same results - the red button experiment
does not compete well when β and δ are included. The only noteworthy diﬀerence is that
the indicator predicts smoking slightly better than the number of clicks (p < 0.01).
Given the historical dominance of the exponential discounting model in economics, we
also used all our choice data to reestimate δ under the assumption of no present bias (i.e.,
restricting β = 1). In Table 8 we examine how well simple exponential discounting does
compared to the results of Tables 5 and 6 that use the quasi-hyperbolic model. As one can
see, the exponential model does well, predicting three of the six outcomes, however, this
is one less than was previously predicted by δ. Without controlling for present-bias, the
exponential discount factor is partially confounded and unable to predict washing out of
training. In addition, restricting attention to the coterminous outcomes, one sees that not
controlling for β leads the eﬀects of δ to be overstated. While the diﬀerence is not too large
for credit scores or BMI, in the ﬁrst column it is clear that the simple discount factor absorbs
a considerable amount of variation that should be attributed to present bias.
5 Conclusion
While there is a considerable literature in both economics and psychology that attempts to
measure time preferences and link them to important outcomes, there is no strong sense in
this literature as to which measures perform best. In most cases, preferences are measured
only using a single instrument and results tend only to be published when that measure
predicts. With a large sample we test the ability of four diﬀerent measures (picked to be
representative of current methods) to predict outcomes both when they are asked to do so
one at a time and when they are forced to compete head-to-head. Considering ﬁrst bivariate
relationships, we ﬁnd that all four measures predict to some degree; however, while the simple
discount factor (δ) predicts four of our six outcomes and present bias (β) predicts three, our
new, adult, version of Mischel’s test of impulsivity is associated with only two coterminous
outcomes and our impatience survey comes close just once. These results overlap to a large
degree with the results that we get when we include all the measures in the same regression
model and control for a number of other factors. In the end, it appears that the now familiar
(β,δ) model of preferences ﬁrst oﬀered by Phelps and Pollak (1968) is the most robust
predictor of outcomes. Further, our regression results suggest that it might also be the case
that gathering just δ or β is a mistake, we ﬁnd that the prediction of outcomes is more
robust when both measures are included.
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Behavioral Measures and Subsequent Outcomes
Figure 2: The Eﬀect of Time Preference on Subsequent Outcomes.
17Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N=1069)
Characteristic Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IQ Score 1013 45.47 7.79 7 60
Numeracy Score 1069 8.42 2.62 0 12
Age (years) 1069 37.43 10.89 21 69
Schooling above High School (I) 1069 0.57 0.49 0 1
English is 2nd Language (I) 1069 0.03 0.18 0 1
African American (I) 1067 0.14 0.35 0 1
Married (I) 1069 0.48 0.50 0 1
Months Unemployed 1068 2.23 4.23 0 24
Family Income less than 30k (I) 1069 0.70 0.45 0 1
Monthly Expenditures above 1.5k (I) 1069 0.45 0.50 0 1
Military Experience (I) 1069 0.28 0.45 0 1
Surveyed Impatience 1069 0.21 0.60 0 6
Present Bias (Beta) 1015 0.90 0.13 0.56 1.07
Discount Factor (Delta) 1015 0.99 0.01 0.97 1.00
Click? (I) 1069 0.24 0.43 0 1
Red Button Clicks 1068 0.38 0.80 0 3
Time Waited 1069 525.09 151.67 7.63 600
Smoke (I) 811 0.46 0.50 0 1
Credit Score 944 588.16 93.21 407 821
Body Mass Index 841 29.71 6.46 17.15 52.46
Leave for any Reason (I) 1069 0.67 0.47 0 1
Washout of Training (I) 1069 0.11 0.31 0 1
AWOL from the Job (I) 955 0.10 0.30 0 1
Table 2: The Distribution of Discounting Types
β = 1 β < 1
δ = 1 52%; ¯ δ = 0.989, ¯ β = 0.921 9%; ¯ δ = 0.980, ¯ β = 0.627
δ < 1 33%; ¯ δ = 0.985, ¯ β = 0.967 6%; ¯ δ = 0.986, ¯ β = 0.826
18Table 3: The Determinants of Time Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Survey Beta Delta Click? Number of Clicks
IQ Scores 0.029 0.036 0.083** -0.025 -0.014
(0.038) (0.042) (0.039) (0.040) (0.091)
Numeracy Scores -0.089 0.185*** 0.105*** -0.096*** -0.379***
(0.073) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039) (0.098)
Age (years)s -0.026 0.091*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 0.453***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.035) (0.095)
Schooling above High School (I) 0.091* 0.013 0.001** -0.210** -0.404***
(0.049) (0.009) (0.001) (0.095) (0.137)
English is Second Language (I) -0.037 0.015 0.004** 0.191 0.454
(0.081) (0.023) (0.002) (0.243) (0.308)
African American (I) -0.028 -0.043*** -0.003*** 0.074 0.047
(0.068) (0.013) (0.001) (0.128) (0.176)
Married (I) -0.025 -0.017** -0.001 0.060 0.089
(0.032) (0.009) (0.001) (0.094) (0.141)
Months Unemployeds -0.024 0.012 -0.008 0.002 -0.032
(0.022) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.081)
Family Income below 30k (I) -0.027 -0.008 -0.000 -0.016 -0.055
(0.053) (0.009) (0.001) (0.101) (0.149)
Monthly Expenditures above 1.5k (I) -0.019 -0.001 0.001** 0.104 0.085
(0.044) (0.009) (0.001) (0.097) (0.144)
Military Experience (I) -0.092*** 0.007 -0.001 -0.138 -0.047
(0.029) (0.010) (0.001) (0.107) (0.162)
Observations 1012 958 958 1012 1012
Marginal eﬀects from OLS, probit and negative binomial estimates; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. sindicates standardized regression coeﬃcient.
19Table 4: Examining the Construct Validity of Clicking
Red Button Clicks (1) (2) (3) (4)
Present Bias (Beta) -1.638*** -1.467***
(0.468) (0.545)
Discount Factor (Delta) -17.612** -6.480
(7.452) (8.704)
Impatience (F) 0.077* 0.079
(0.048) (0.056)
Constant 0.494 16.411** -0.959*** 6.732
(0.415) (7.344) (0.064) (8.340)
lnalpha
Constant 0.796*** 0.831*** 0.812*** 0.787***
(0.129) (0.126) (0.122) (0.129)
Observations 1014 1014 1068 1014
Marginal eﬀects after negative binomial estimates; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
20Table 5: Time Preferences and Coterminus Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Smoke? Credit Score BMI
Impatience (F)s -0.014 0.038 -0.014
(0.044) (0.031) (0.031)
Present Bias (Beta)s -0.100** 0.016 0.024
(0.044) (0.038) (0.039)
Discount Factor (Delta)s -0.091** 0.121*** -0.002
(0.042) (0.037) (0.042)
Red Button Clickss 0.033 0.051 -0.023
(0.042) (0.033) (0.033)
IQ Scores 0.008 0.011 -0.003
(0.049) (0.042) (0.044)
Numeracy Scores -0.057 0.080* 0.089**
(0.050) (0.043) (0.045)
Age (years)s -0.067 0.235*** -0.022
(0.043) (0.039) (0.039)
Schooling above High School (I) -0.060 5.339 -0.166
(0.041) (6.708) (0.493)
English is Second Language (I) -0.065 9.250 -2.463***
(0.102) (15.609) (1.004)
African American (I) -0.243*** -49.646*** 0.526
(0.053) (8.268) (0.667)
Married (I) -0.066* 1.849 0.633
(0.039) (6.229) (0.478)
Months Unemployeds 0.060* -0.015 0.097**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Family Income below 30k (I) 0.049 -11.200 -0.206
(0.042) (6.954) (0.512)
Monthly Expenditures above 1.5k (I) -0.076* 5.303 0.477
(0.040) (6.564) (0.487)
Military Experience (I) 0.055 -1.466 -1.756***
(0.044) (6.885) (0.466)
Observations 754 845 782
Marginal eﬀects after probit estimates and OLS; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. sindicates standardized regression coeﬃcient.
21Table 6: Time Preferences and Subsequent Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Leave? Wash Out? AWOL?
Impatience (F)s 0.032 0.047** -0.007
(0.042) (0.022) (0.036)
Present Bias (Beta)s -0.065* -0.081** 0.043
(0.039) (0.034) (0.035)
Discount Factor (Delta)s 0.030 -0.066** -0.100***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.036)
Red Button Clickss -0.032 -0.016 -0.035
(0.035) (0.027) (0.037)
IQ Scores -0.169*** -0.094*** 0.014
(0.046) (0.033) (0.038)
Numeracy Scores -0.050 -0.030 -0.094**
(0.043) (0.036) (0.042)
Age (years)s -0.045 0.129*** -0.064*
(0.038) (0.032) (0.039)
Schooling above High School (I) -0.001 0.017 -0.005
(0.034) (0.019) (0.022)
English is Second Language (I) -0.089 0.036 0.007
(0.091) (0.052) (0.062)
African American (I) 0.092** 0.135*** 0.040
(0.044) (0.037) (0.035)
Married (I) -0.040 -0.025 0.025
(0.032) (0.018) (0.021)
Months Unemployeds 0.052 0.051** 0.028
(0.033) (0.025) (0.031)
Family Income below 30k (I) -0.038 -0.019 -0.004
(0.035) (0.022) (0.023)
Monthly Expenditures above 1.5k (I) -0.004 0.009 -0.003
(0.034) (0.019) (0.021)
Military Experience (I) -0.007 -0.014 -0.025
(0.036) (0.020) (0.023)
Observations 958 958 853
Marginal eﬀects after probit estimates; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. sindicates standardized regression coeﬃcient.
22Table 7: Clicking any Number of Times and Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smoke? Credit Score BMI Leave? Wash Out? AWOL?
Impatience (F)s -0.014 0.038 -0.015 0.031 0.047** -0.006
(0.044) (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) (0.022) (0.036)
Present Bias (Beta)s -0.099** 0.014 0.025 -0.063* -0.080** 0.045
(0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035)
Discount Factor (Delta)s -0.088** 0.124*** -0.001 0.031 -0.066* -0.102***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035)
Click? (I) 0.100*** 0.055 -0.009 -0.005 -0.019 -0.035
(0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031)
Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 754 845 782 958 958 853
Marginal eﬀects after probit estimates and OLS; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. sindicates standardized regression coeﬃcient.
Table 8: Exponential Discounting and Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Smoke? Credit Score BMI Leave? Wash Out? AWOL?
Impatience (F)s -0.021 0.038 -0.012 0.027 0.041** -0.001
(0.044) (0.031) (0.030) (0.042) (0.021) (0.036)
Exponential Discount Factor (Delta)s -0.133*** 0.121*** 0.010 -0.002 0.021 -0.073**
(0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030)
Red Button Clickss 0.037 0.051 -0.024 -0.029 -0.011 -0.040
(0.042) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.027) (0.037)
Controls Included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 754 845 782 958 958 853
Marginal eﬀects after probit estimates and OLS; (robust standard errors).
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. sindicates standardized regression coeﬃceint.
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